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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Is The Addition Of A Pollutant To Groundwater That Is
Tributary To, But Not In Close Proximity With, Tradition-
ally Navigable Surface Water A Violation of 33 U.S.C.
§1311(a)?
II. In A 33 U.S.C. §1365 Enforcement Action Alleging
Violation Of A Permit Provision Prohibiting Discharges
That "Violate Water Quality Standards," Is The Permittee!
Defendant Permitted Under 33 U.S.C. §1369 To Seek
Dismissal Of The Action On The Basis That The Provision
Is Not Specific Enough To Be An Enforceable Permit
Provision?
III. Is The Interpretation Of A Provision Prohibiting
Discharges That "Violate Water Quality Standards" In A
Permit Issued By The Federal Governement Pursuant To
33 U.S.C. §1342 Governed By Federal Or State Law When
The Provision Is Included Routinely In Federally Issued
Permits And Is Also Required To Be In The Permit By A
Certification Condition Imposed By New Union Pursuant
To 33 U.S.C. §1341?
IV. If The Interpretation Of A CWA Permit Provision
Prohibiting Discharges That "Violate Water Quality Stan-
dards" Is Governed By Federal Law, Is The Addition Of A
Pollutant To Navigable Water Causing The Water To Be
Unfit For Its Water Quality Standard Designated Use A
Violation Of The Provision Without Further Administrative
Action To Establish Effluent Limitations On The Pollutant
In The Permit?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Appellant, XXX Corp. (XXX) was Defendant below. Ap-
pellee, Friends of the Roaritan, Inc. ("FOR") was Plaintiff be-
low. State of New Union, who intervened in the action below,
joined XXX as to some of the claims and FOR as to other
claims. Therefore, State of New Union is now both an Appel-
lant and Appellee.
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OPINION BELOW AND JURISDICTION
This case involves an appeal from the order of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union denying
defendant XXX Corp.'s (XXX) motion to dismiss all Clean
Water Act violations asserted against it. See Friends of the
Roaritan, Inc. v. XXX Corp., Civ. No. 97-8367, Record 3
(D.N.U. undated). The district court certified its order for ap-
peal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994) and XXX ap-
pealed to this court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), this court has
jurisdiction to review district court orders upon proper
certification.
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides in
pertinent part that "the Laws of the United States ... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."
Relevant statutory provisions of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) are addressed in the text. Other relevant statutes in-
clude the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 300f to 300j-
25 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6972 (1994). The full text of
all relevant statutory provisions are laid out in the attached
Appendix.
Relevant regulatory provisions are laid out in the at-
tached Appendix and include: 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (1998);
40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (1998); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
In 1985, XXX, a manufacturer of poisons designed for
controlling pests and vectors, purchased a forty acre site lo-
cated one mile from the Roaritan River. See Record 4. On that
property sits a waste pile where XXX's predecessor discarded
all unrecycled material from it's automobile battery recycling
business. See id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/6
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This waste pile is the source of Friends of the Roaritan,
Inc.'s (FOR) first set of allegations against XXX. FOR alleges
that samples of the waste pile obtained by the New Union
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) contain con-
centrations of lead, and FOR alleges that the groundwater
has been polluted with lead that seeped into the ground from
precipitation falling on the pile. See id. FOR further alleges
that its data indicates that levels of lead in the Roaritan in-
crease gradually over the half mile stretch downriver from
XXX's discharge pipe. However, the data also shows that no
lead is discharged from the actual pipe. See id. FOR bases its
allegations against XXX partially on DEP mapping, which
shows that groundwater in the general vicinity of the XXX
property moves in the direction of the Roaritan. See id.
FOR's second set of allegations relate to the discharge,
authorized by a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit issued by the Region XI office of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), of wastewater
that has been treated and released through a mile-long pipe
situated between XXX's property and the Roaritan. See id.
FOR alleges that XXX, by discharging selenium into the
Roaritan, is violating standard language in EPA permits that
prohibits discharges that "violate water quality standards."
See id. This language was included in section IIA3 of XXX's
permit as a condition to certification by New Union that the
permit satisfies CWA and state law requirements. Selenium
is not specifically limited in the permit. See id. FOR alleges
that parts of the Roaritan downstream from XXX's discharge
pipe cannot be used for human consumption as a result of
selenium discharge. Therefore, FOR alleges, XXX is violating
water quality standards by contributing to selenium levels in
excess of the maximum contaminant levels for selenium
under the Safe Drinking Water Act, even though New Union
has not adopted speicific water quality criterion for selenium.
See id. at 5.
Procedural History
FOR brought a citizen's suit against XXX under the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1365 (1994) (CWA), and the Re-
1999] 475
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source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901,
6972 (1994) (RCRA). See id. at 1. The suit was based upon
two sets of alleged violations of § 301(a) of the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994). See id. at 3. New Union intervened in
the action, joining FOR as to some causes of action and XXX
as to others. See id.
XXX subsequently filed a motion to dismiss all of the
CWA causes of action filed against it, and the United States
District Court for the District of New Union denied XXX's
motion in an undated opinion. See id. at 3. The district court
certified its order for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) due to
common factual issues between the CWA causes of action and
the RCRA causes of action. See id. at 1. XXX appealed the
order. See id.
Standard of Review
This appeal seeks review of the district court's rejection
of a motion to dismiss. In review of a district court's decision
on a motion to dismiss, the issues raised are questions of law
and the courts of appeal apply a de novo standard of review.
See Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd., 126 F.3d 178,
181 (3d Cir. 1997); New Valley Corp. v. United States, 119
F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d
803, 806 (6th Cir. 1997).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The addition of a pollutant to groundwater which is trib-
utary to, but not in close proximity with, traditionally naviga-
ble surface water is not a violation of § 301(a) of the CWA for
two reasons. First, groundwater is not "navigable water"
under the CWA, and therefore groundwater is beyond the
scope of the statute. A combination of the actual language of
the statute and legislative history of the statute indicate that
groundwater was purposely excluded from the enforcement
provisions of the statute. Second, even if this court finds that
some groundwater should be included within the statute,
water which is not in close proximity with surface water, like
the water at issue, must be excluded. Such a broad interpre-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/6
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tation would be over-inclusive and would have negative prac-
tical consequences.
XXX still has standing to challenge the provisions in sec-
tion IIA3 of its EPA issued NPDES permit. Section 509(b)(2)
of the CWA does not prohibit XXX from having standing to
challenge the application of CWA standards and New Union's
purely aspirational water quality goals to section IIA3 of
XXX's permit. XXX did not have an opportunity to challenge
the permit when it was first issued because the issue was not
ripe for judicial review. The legal issues lacked sufficient spe-
cifics at the time the XXX's permit was issued, so the permit
and DEP's water quality standards were not "final" review-
able agency actions until now. Because § 509(b)(2) of the
CWA only prohibits judicial review that should have taken
place at an earlier time and no such earlier review was avail-
able for XXX due to a lack of ripeness, XXX still has standing
to challenge the provisions of section IIA3 of its NPDES
permit.
The provision in XXX's NPDES permit that prohibits dis-
charges that "violate water quality standards" must be inter-
preted in accordance with state law for three reasons. First,
under § 303 of the CWA, states are given authority to issue
and revise water quality standards. Because states do this
pursuant to state law, any interpretation of the scope and
meaning of water quality standards must be governed by
state law. Second, under § 401 of the CWA, states can condi-
tion approval of a NPDES permit on inclusion of require-
ments that the permit comply with state law. Because New
Union required the provision in section IIA3 of XXX's permit
so that the permit would comply with state law, interpreta-
tion of the water quality standards in that provision must be
governed by state law. Finally, even though the EPA is re-
quired to approve all state-adopted water quality standards,
EPA approval does not cause the standards to become a part
of federal law and, as a result, have interpretation in accord-
ance with state law pre-empted by federal law. Instead, inter-
pretation of water quality standards is still governed by state
law because such an interpretation complies with the
1999] 477
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Supreme Court's presumption against pre-emption of state
law.
If the provision in XXX's NPDES permit that prohibits
discharges that "violate water quality standards" is governed
by federal law, then, before FOR can enforce this permit pro-
vision through a citizen's suit, further administrative action
is required to either establish water quality criteria or allo-
cate total effluent waste load among polluters. FOR cannot
bring its citizen's suit for two reasons. First, the plain mean-
ing, the legislative history, and the federal courts' interpreta-
tion of the CWA require that water quality standards must
contain water quality criteria and must be reduced to specific
numerical limitations before the standards can be enforced in
a citizen's suit. Because New Union's water quality standards
do not contain water quality criteria and have not been re-
duced to numerical limitations, they cannot be enforced in
FOR's citizen's suit. Second, under federal law, either the
EPA or New Union must allocate, among all dischargers, the
total effluent waste load that a water body can handle before
a discharger can be found in violation of its NPDES permit.
Because the EPA and New Union have failed to make such an
allocation for discharge of selenium, FOR's enforcement of
XXX's selenium discharge is premature.
ARGUMENT
I. The Addition Of A Pollutant To Groundwater
Which Is Tributary To, But Not In Close
Proximity With, Traditionally Navigable
Surface Water Is Not A Violation Of 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a).
Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), provides
that the "discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful" except as in compliance with other sections of the
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994). One such exception is found
in § 402(a) of the CWA, which allows regulated discharges of
pollutants for people who have obtained a permit through the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994). The term "discharge of any
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/6
pollutant" is further defined in section 502(12) of the CWA, as
"any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994).
The term "navigable waters" has been defined broadly to
mean "the waters of the United States, including the territo-
rial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Some courts have interpreted
the term as broadly as possible under Congress' commerce
power. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379
(S.D. Tex.1975). Despite this broad definition, there is cur-
rently a split within the federal courts as to whether ground-
water should be included within the definition of navigable
water, or whether Congress instead intended for the CWA
general enforcement provisions to apply to surface water
only.
This court should follow the jurisdictions holding that all
groundwater is excluded from the definition because both the
language of the CWA and legislative history demonstrate that
Congress did not intend to include any groundwater within
the scope of the regulatory and enforcement sections. How-
ever, if this court wishes to follow the other jurisdictions and
find that some groundwater was meant to be included in
§ 301(a) of the CWA, practical considerations require that
groundwater sources such as the one at issue must not be
regulated. To include such groundwater that is tributary to,
but not in close proximity with, navigable waters would be
over-inclusive and would lead to difficulty in both permitting
and enforcement.
A. This court should reverse the lower court's holding
denying XXX's motion to dismiss FOR's claims
because groundwater is not "navigable water" for
purposes of § 301(a) of the Clean Water Act and
therefore no cause of action can exist.
Congress, in defining the term "navigable waters" to in-
clude "waters of the United States," did not intend to include
groundwater within that definition, and therefore the lower
court erred in ruling that a cause of action could lie against
1999] BRIEF 479
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XXX for an alleged discharge into groundwater in violation of
§ 301(a) of the CWA. Congress simply did not intend for any
groundwater to be included in the enforcement section at is-
sue here, and this court should follow the various jurisdic-
tions which have so held.
First, the language of the statute itself leads to the con-
clusion that Congress purposely chose to exclude ground-
water from the section because it explicitly included
groundwater within the scope of several other sections within
the CWA but failed to do so in the enforcement provisions at
issue here. Congress considered groundwater to be a different
category of water than navigable water and did not intend to
require NPDES permits for discharge of pollutants to
groundwater.
Second, legislative history demonstrates that when Con-
gress was writing the CWA, it did not feel confident that
groundwater should be handled in the same way that other
forms of water should be handled. Instead, language demon-
strates that legislators felt that groundwater legislation
would be more appropriately placed in the jurisdiction of the
individual states and therefore did not intend for ground-
water to be considered navigable water for the purposes of
§ 301(a). Additionally, this issue was debated in a heated
House argument, and a bill that would have had the effect of
explicitly including groundwater in the definition section
failed to pass.
For these reasons, this court should follow the clear in-
tent of the legislature, evident both through statutory lan-
guage and legislative history, and limit the broad
interpretation of navigable water asserted by the lower court.
1. The language of the CWA demonstrates that
Congress did not intend for groundwater to be
included as "navigable water" in the regulatory
and enforcement provisions.
Congress, in writing the CWA, specifically included the
word "groundwater" in several provisions of the Act but failed
to include such language in the enforcement section of
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/6
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§ 301(a). This evidences an explicit intent to exclude ground-
water from the section. For example, in one section, Congress
stated that the Administrator shall "prepare or develop com-
prehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or eliminating
the pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters and
improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994) (emphasis added). An-
other section states that the Administrator shall "establish,
equip, and maintain a water quality surveillance system for
the purpose of monitoring the quality of the navigable waters
and ground waters and the contiguous zone and the oceans."
33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
These sections demonstrate that Congress considered
groundwater to be a different category than other waters. The
use of the connecting word "and" between the terms "naviga-
ble waters" and "ground waters" shows that Congress viewed
those two types of water as mutually exclusive. Groundwater
was not intended as a subset of the larger category "navigable
waters." Therefore, FOR is incorrect in its assertion that
groundwater is meant to be included as part of the broad
term "navigable waters." Furthermore, these sections, along
with others that specifically use the term "ground waters,"
demonstrate that Congress specifically included the term
where it so desired and could have included it in the enforce-
ment section if it chose to do so.
Indeed, in Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association,
Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., the court was asked to de-
cide whether the leaching of sodium and chloride from a brine
lagoon into groundwater traveling to a creek was an imper-
missible discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. See
962 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997). The court reviewed these
two quoted statutory provisions and concluded that "Con-
gress did not consider discharges to groundwater to be dis-
charges that would trigger the NPDES permit requirement."
Id. at 1318.
Additionally, administrative interpretations of the term
have limited the reach of the term "waters of the United
States." See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1998); 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.3(s)(3) (1998). The regulations do not specifically ad-
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dress groundwater and state that "waters of the United
States" includes "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natu-
ral ponds." 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3). Because this list is spe-
cific, it can be inferred that the list was meant to be
exhaustive, thus excluding groundwater from the scope of the
definition.
2. Legislative history demonstrates that Congress did
not intend to regulate groundwater.
Legislative history of the CWA conclusively demonstrates
that Congress purposely declined to include groundwater
within the scope of the federal regulatory power of the CWA.
This legislative evidence rebuts any potential assertion by
FOR that Congress intended to utilize its powers to the ful-
lest extent of its Commerce Clause capability. FOR may ar-
gue, as it did in the court below, that all prior groundwater
regulation caselaw is distinguishable from the factual cir-
cumstances of this case because this case specifically ad-
dresses tributary groundwater, whereas the bulk of litigation
up to the present time has not dealt squarely with this tribu-
tary water issue. Although that may be true, a detailed
caselaw analysis is not helpful in reaching a decision in this
case because the jurisdictions have disagreed on their inter-
pretations of what Congress intended to regulate in the CWA.
Instead, this court should look directly to what Congress it-
self has said and done when implementing the CWA. Such an
analysis of legislative history leads to the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to include any groundwater within
the enforcement provisions of the CWA.
a. In passing the CWA, the Senate intentionally
excluded groundwater from federal
regulation.
A report accompanying the Senate version of the CWA
stated that "[s]everal bills pending before the Committee pro-
vided authority to establish Federally approved standards for
groundwaters which permeate rock, soil, and other surface
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formations. Because the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters
is so complex and varied from State to State, the Committee
did not adopt this recommendation." S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 73
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3749.
Therefore, it is apparent that the Senate did consider in-
cluding groundwater within the CWA and yet refused to do so
because of the lack of adequate knowledge regarding ground-
water. Instead, Congress left the regulation of groundwater
to the individual states because it was considered impractica-
ble to create federal legislation to control pollution of ground-
water when groundwater rules varied greatly among the
states. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1325
(5th Cir. 1977).
b. In passing the CWA, the House specifically
rejected an amendment that would have
brought groundwater within the
enforcement and permitting sections of
the bill.
An amendment was proposed by Democratic Representa-
tive Les Aspin during the floor debate on the House Bill that
advocated bringing groundwater within the permit provi-
sions. Representative Aspin noted that groundwater "is
under the title dealing with definitions. But when it comes to
enforcement, Title IV, the section on permits and licenses,
then groundwater is suddenly missing .... [T]o control only
navigable waters and not the ground water makes no sense
at all." 118 Cong. Rec. 10,666 (1972). After debate on the pro-
posed amendment in H.R. 11896, the amendment was re-
jected on March 28, 1972 by a vote of 86 to 34. See 118 Cong.
Rec. 10,669 (1972).
This debate illustrates that the House had ample oppor-
tunity to include groundwater within the pollution control
provisions but declined to do so. The failure of the proposed
amendment "strongly militates against a judgment that Con-
gress intended a result that it expressly declined to act." Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
Therefore, this court should not act where Congress has con-
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ferred no jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. GAF Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
FOR may assert that the Aspin Amendment also con-
tained provisions that would have deleted exemptions for oil
and gas well injections and assert that it was the oil and gas
provisions that caused the amendment to fail rather than the
groundwater provisions. Such an assertion is mere specula-
tion, and the fact remains that the groundwater provisions
were not passed either at the time the CWA took effect or at
any time in the future. Surely, if the House had wanted the
amendment to pass, it could have resubmitted a similar pro-
vision at some later point, but it has not.
c. The EPA has not promulgated regulations or
interpreted the statute in a way indicating
that groundwater should be subject to the
enforcement and permitting
requirements.
Despite the fact that there has been much recent debate
concerning the breadth of the term "navigable waters," the
EPA has declined to assert that even hydrologically con-
nected groundwater is subject to NPDES permitting. Indeed,
if the EPA did interpret the statute to say that such ground-
water should be included in the definition of "navigable wa-
ters," this interpretation would be afforded much deference.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 467 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). Instead, the Office of General
Counsel advised EPA that "[ulnder § 502(12) the term 'dis-
charge of a pollutant' is defined so as to include only dis-
charges into navigable waters. Discharges into ground waters
are not included." Opinion, Office of General Counsel (1973),
reprinted in Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1321 n. 21
(5th Cir. 1977).
Therefore, in light of the statutory language of the CWA,
the legislative history behind the CWA, and the absence of
contrary guidance by the EPA, groundwater should not be in-
cluded within the meaning of "navigable waters." For the ju-
diciary to hold otherwise would be usurping the role of the
legislature because Congress explicitly left groundwater reg-
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/6
BRIEF
ulation to the states. Any potential unfavorable results that
this may create must be changed by clear legislative mandate
rather than through judicial alteration of the applicable stat-
utory language.
B. Even if this court determines that some groundwater
should be included within the definition of "navigable
water," groundwater that is tributary to, but not
in close proximity with, traditionally navigable
surface water should be excluded from the § 301(a)
provision.
Assuming arguendo that this court concludes that Con-
gress did intend for the CWA to include at least some types of
groundwater, groundwater of the type at issue here must not
be regulated because the connection with navigable water is
too tenuous to bring it within the parameters of CWA juris-
diction. The various types of groundwater may be considered
as part of a continuum. On one extreme is isolated ground-
water that will not reach surface waters, which has been held
by various courts to not be navigable. See, e.g., Village of Oco-
nomowac Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.
1994); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977).
On the other extreme is surface water, which is clearly held
to be navigable. All other groundwater fits somewhere in the
middle of that continuum, and a line must be drawn delineat-
ing navigable from not navigable.
FOR asserts that groundwater that is tributary to sur-
face water must be considered navigable because it may even-
tually run into surface water, and therefore to hold otherwise
would frustrate the general goal of the CWA to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of
the nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). However, to
hold that groundwater not in close proximity with surface
water, whether tributary to it or not, is navigable water and
therefore subject to permitting would be over-inclusive and
impractical.
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1. A broad interpretation of "navigable water" that
would include groundwater not in close proximity
with surface water would be over-inclusive.
Because almost all groundwater has at least some chance
of eventually flowing into surface water at some point, there
is arguably no water that is completely isolated and non-trib-
utary. Therefore, the broad interpretation of "navigable" put
forth by FOR would have the effect of regulating almost all
groundwater. This concern was addressed in Village of Oco-
nomowac Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.
1994). There, the court had to decide whether the federal gov-
ernment had asserted authority over artificial ponds that
might drain into ground waters. The court stated that even
though there was a possibility of a hydrological connection,
"neither the statute nor the regulations makes such a possi-
bility a sufficient ground of regulation." Id. at 965.
The court was concerned that to some extent, all waters
would be considered within the power of the national govern-
ment, which would be too far of an extension. The court also
noted another Seventh Circuit case and concluded that "even
a rule with such broad scope did not cover a one-acre wetland
750 feet from a small creek." Id. at 965 (citing Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r, EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir.
1993)). In the instant case, XXX is located at a distance of
one-half mile away from the navigable surface water, which
is simply too far away. See Record 4. To include such water as
navigable would render virtually all water open to federal
regulation under the CWA.
2. A broad interpretation of "navigable water" that
would include groundwater not in close proximity
with surface water would have negative
practical consequences.
In addition to the fact that regulation of distant ground-
water would be over-inclusive, it would also be counter-
productive and make permitting and enforcement extremely
impracticable.
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First, over-regulation may actually damage society as a
whole because it may prevent companies from undertaking
economically advantageous activities on their private land. If
the CWA is extended to include any groundwater that may
eventually reach some surface water, potential companies
might decide it is not worth the difficulty of obtaining and
upkeeping a permit and would instead refrain from using
their land for any advantageous purpose.
A related problem would be that extending the definition
of groundwater will make it virtually impossible to observe
and sample potential problem areas. This is particularly true
in a case such as this one where groundwater is not in close
proximity with the navigable surface water because the po-
tential areas that would need to be sampled would be endless.
Additionally, it would be difficult to pinpoint who the polluter
is because often the pollutant could be emanating from vari-
ous sources. Although that fact does not appear to be an issue
in this case, it may be a problem in other cases in more popu-
lated areas.
These difficulties in sampling and accountability would
make permitting impracticable. Scientific uncertainty would
make it difficult to cover all possible contingencies when issu-
ing a permit. Similarly, permits usually contain reporting re-
quirements wherein the company must track pollutant
discharge. Reporting pollution of groundwater that may be
connected in any way to surface water would be difficult be-
cause such pollution would be difficult to detect. Ground-
water leaching would be difficult to detect because it is not as
exact, for example, as leakage from a stationary pipe contain-
ing materials known to the company.
These practical consequences were addressed in Uma-
tilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen
Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997), which held that
the NPDES program does not apply to any discharges to
groundwater. It voiced concern by saying that a rule that
would include groundwater "would add a new level of uncer-
tainty and expense to NPDES permitting and would expose
potentially hundreds of WPCF permittees to current or fu-
ture litigation." Id.
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It is crucial to note that a limited interpretation will not
lead to a situation where corporations are free to pollute
groundwater without any accountability. There are other fed-
eral statutes designed specifically to deal with the ground-
water pollution dilemma. The Safe Drinking Water Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Under-
ground Injection Control Program are examples of other fed-
eral legislation that specifically encompass groundwater
within their scope. Also, states are free to enact tougher regu-
lations pertaining to groundwater pollution. Additionally,
Congress is still free to implement regulations that would ex-
pressly include groundwaters within the jurisdiction of the
CWA. However, until that happens, this court must effectuate
the CWA as written and intended by Congress, and the CWA
currently cannot be read to include groundwaters within its
scope.
II. Because The Issue Was Not Ripe When XXX's
NPDES Permit Was Issued, XXX Now Has
Standing To Call For A Judicial Review.
A. Because XXX could not have successfully sought
judicial review when its NPDES permit was issued it
is not banned from seeking review at this point.
XXX has standing to ask for a judicial review of section
IIA3 of its NPDES permit and the DEP controls over water
quality. The discharge permit issued to XXX and the purely
aspirational water quality goals incorporated therein are
agency actions. However, agency actions are subject to judi-
cial review by the courts once they have become "final" deci-
sions. See generally FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232
(1980); Abbott Lab. v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). It is es-
sential that the court recognize that agency action at the time
the NPDES permit was issued to XXX could not have been a
final agency decision because the permit and the water qual-
ity standards issued by the DEP failed to specify selenium
levels, so a judicial review was not possible under § 509 (b)(1)
of the CWA. Because it was not possible for XXX to seek a
judicial review at the time the permit was issued, XXX is not
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banned by § 509(b)(2) of the CWA from seeking a judicial re-
view. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (b)(2) (1994). The reasoning of the
court below was accurate when it held that the issue was not
ripe for review earlier but is ripe for review now. See Record
7. Without ripeness, XXX did not have standing to seek judi-
cial review when the discharge permit was issued; thus XXX
currently has standing to ask this court for review.
In Abbott Laboratories the United States Supreme Court
laid out a two part test to determine if an issue is ripe for
judicial review: (1) a court must determine the fitness of an
issue for a judicial decision and (2) evaluate the hardship to
the parties in withholding the courts review. See Abbott Lab.,
387 U.S. at 149. At the time the discharge permit was first
granted to XXX a request for review would have failed the
Abbott Laboratories test.
B. Because an issue must be grounded in enough facts to
be ripe, a judicial review of XXX's NPDES permit
was not possible when the permit was first issued.
In applying the Abbott Laboratories test for a judicial re-
view to a regulation issued by an government environmental
agency, the courts can look to specific applications of the Ab-
bott Laboratories test. Part one, examining "fitness of the is-
sue," may be evaluated by determining if an obligation
imposed by the regulation would require an "immediate and
significant change" in a party's conduct. Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Train, 649 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1980); see
also Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 153. In Commonwealth Edison,
the Seventh Circuit found that when it is impossible to pre-
dict how a regulation will affect a party, an issue is not ripe
for judicial review. Commonwealth Edison, 649 F.2d at 484-
485. In that case, the court found that criteria imposed by a
water pollution regulation were too unspecified to merit a ju-
dicial review. Likewise, when the NPDES permit containing
section IIA3 was issued to XXX, it was too unspecified to
merit a judicial review. Section IIA3 of the NPDES permit
contained general boilerplate language used by the EPA in all
of its NPDES permits, see Record 4, and the DEP had not
adopted any water quality standards specifically limiting dis-
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charges of selenium, see id. at 5. If XXX had tried to seek judi-
cial review of the permit at the time it was issued, a court
would not have been able to rule because the issue was not
yet ripe for review.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has detailed criteria
on what makes an agency decision "final" and reviewable,
and thus fit for judicial review. In FTC v. Standard Oil Co.,
the Court set out the following criteria for identifying if an
agency decision is final (and, thus, reviewable): (1) whether
the action is a definitive statement of the agency's position;
(2) whether the action had the status of law and immediate
compliance with its terms was expected; (3) whether the ac-
tion had a direct impact on the day to day business of the
plaintiff; and (4) whether a pre-enforcement action was calcu-
lated to speed enforcement. See Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at
239-40, cited with approval in Natural Resources Defense
Counsil, Inc. v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1407 (4th Cir. 1993).
The language of section IIA3 of XXX's permit is not spe-
cific; New Union has not adopted any specific numerical re-
quirements for selenium; and the Supreme Court of New
Union has ruled that water quality standards for designated
uses are purely aspirational and require numerical or other
specific limitations to be enforceable. See Record 5-6. Thus,
section IIA3 of XXX's permit was neither (1) a definitive
statement of an agency's position nor (2) a status of law re-
quiring immediate compliance. When the permit was issued
there was no clear indication from the DEP of what limits for
selenium were enforceable. Thus, it would have been impossi-
ble for XXX or a court to determine if there was a violation of
the permit when it was first issued.
Regarding the third part of the Standard Oil test, the
interpretation and application of section I13A of XXX's permit
had no direct impact on the day to day business of XXX when
the permit was issued. However, now that a legal claim has
been made against XXX, and it faces liability for water qual-
ity levels in the Roaritan, the permit section's interpretation
and application will have significant impact not only on liabil-
ity for past action, but on future conduct.
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Finally, since section IIA3 is boilerplate and New Union
has not set specific requirements regarding water quality
standards, see Record 4, it would not have been an efficient
use of judicial resources to view section IIA3 as a "final" re-
viewable agency decision regarding specific water quality
standards at the time it was issued to XXX. New Union may
decide to set specific pollutant standards that are very differ-
ent from any standards a court may have come upon in a
challenge by XXX at the moment the permit was issued. If
XXX would have tried to challenge the permit when it was
first issued, it is likely that they would have faced the same
fate as the plaintiffs in Natural Resources Defense Counsil,
where the court refused to review the agency's water pollu-
tion regulation. See Natural Resources Defense Council 16
F.3d at 1395.
Because, the discharge permit and the DEP water qual-
ity standards were unspecified and not final reviewable
agency decisions at the time the discharge permit was issued,
a challenge by XXX of the permit was not "fit" for a judicial
decision, and thus not ripe. However, because of change of
circumstance and recent arguments presented by third par-
ties XXX now feels that it is a ripe issue.
C. Because XXX could not have presented a ripe issue at
the time the its permit was issued, § 509(b)(2) of the
CWA does not prohibit a current review of the
permit and the DEP's water quality standards.
The second prong of the Abbott Lab. test examining the
hardship on the parties of withholding a court decision did
not merit the issue ripe when the discharge permit was first
issued. When considering whether an issue is ripe for judicial
review, courts have considered whether there will be opportu-
nities for later review. See Commonwealth Edison, 649 F.2d
at 486-487. Many regulations, especially those imposed by a
state agency, may have subsequent opportunities for review,
such as if New Union's DEP adopts a more specific water
quality standard regarding selenium content. In order to
grant judicial review at the time the discharge permit was
issued to XXX, a court would have to be convinced that there
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would be no other possibility for judicial review. Despite the
possible application of § 509(b)(2) of the CWA as precluding
any later review, there is no reason that XXX had to demand
the judicial review at the time the discharge permit was is-
sued. Section 509(b)(2) only applies to judicial reviews which
"could have been obtained' at an earlier date. However, as
discussed above, it was impossible for XXX to seek a review
on such an unspecified and non-final agency decision.
There was no possibility that a court could have granted
review of section IIA3 when the permit was issued. For a
court to now apply § 509(b)(2) would place XXX between the
proverbial rock and a hard place. When the permit was is-
sued there were insufficient specifics to determine exactly
what XXX would have asked a court to determine, yet
§ 509(b)(2) might be interpreted as prohibiting a review at
the current time. This conflict is simply untenable. The
Supreme Court has set out standards for ripeness of judicial
review of agency decisions in Abbott Lab. and Standard Oil.
Applying these precedents to § 509(b)(2) of the CWA cannot
preclude a judicial review at this time because § 509(b)(2)
only applies in situations where an earlier review "could have
been obtained." 33 U.S.C.A. § 509(b)(2). Because the issue
was not ripe when the XXX's permit was first issued, XXX
could not have obtained a judicial review at that time; thus,
XXX still has standing to seek review.
III. State Law Should Govern Interpretation Of The
Provision That Prohibits Discharges That
"Violate Water Quality Standards" In XXX's
Federally Issued NPDES Permit.
The provision of XXX's NPDES permit that prohibits dis-
charges that "violate water quality standards" must be inter-
preted in accordance with state law. Under the CWA, the
water quality standards referenced in XXX's permit are is-
sued by the state and are issued in accordance with state law.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A) (1994). Therefore, in interpret-
ing whether a particular discharge violates "water quality
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standards," a reviewing court must allow the state law under
which the standards are issued to govern that interpretation.
This court should reject the holding below and allow
state law to govern interpretation of when a discharge "vio-
lates water quality standards" for three reasons. First, § 303
of the CWA expressly mandates that water quality standards
are to be promulgated by the states in accordance with state
law. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A). Second, § 401 of the CWA
requires that an applicant for a federal NPDES permit must
first obtain state certification that the permit meets all CWA
and state law requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
Finally, the EPA's approval of state water quality standards
under § 303 of the CWA does not make those standards part
of federal law. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
If state law governs interpretation of state water quality
standards, then XXX's selenium discharges cannot be found
to violate its NPDES permit. The lower court acknowledged
that, under the applicable state law of New Union, desig-
nated water quality uses are not independently enforceable.
See Record 8. The Supreme Court of New Union has affirmed
regulations of the DEP providing that designated uses are
simply goals and, unless reduced to "numerical or other spe-
cific limitations for individual permitted discharges" they are
unenforceable. Record 8 (citing Prentice v. DEP, 435 N.U.
875, 883 (1989) (affirming validity of 40 N.U.A.C.
§ 2346.2(a))). XXX's NPDES permit does not reduce the desig-
nated water quality use for the Roaritan to numerical or spe-
cific limitations. Thus, if this court, pursuant to the following
analysis, should reverse the lower court and rule that state
law governs interpretation of the state water quality stan-
dards in XXX's permit, this court should also apply the state
law of New Union and dismiss FOR's citizen enforcement ac-
tion because XXX's permit incorporates only an unenforce-
able designated water quality use.
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A. This court should reverse the lower court because
water quality standards are promulgated by the
states in accordance with state law and state law
should govern interpretation of when discharges
"violate water quality standards."
Because the CWA exclusively delegates responsibility for
the establishment and maintenance of water quality stan-
dards to the states, the courts have consistently found that
all reference in NPDES permits to water quality standards or
interpretations of water quality standards must be governed
by the same state law that originally gave rise to the water
quality standards. See, e. g., PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 713-716 (1994);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111-112 (1992) (af-
firming an EPA interpretation of Oklahoma state water qual-
ity standards when that interpretation was based on the
same Oklahoma law that originally gave rise to the water
quality standards).
In PUD, the Supreme Court outlined the "distinct role[]
[of] the . . .State Governments" established by the CWA.
PUD, 511 U.S. at 704. First, § 303 of the CWA requires each
state to adopt "pursuant to its own laws water quality stan-
dards applicable to intrastate waters." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). These water quality stan-
dards are to consist of both: (1) designated uses for the waters
and (2) water quality criteria based upon the designated uses.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). Second, the CWA requires that
each state review and, if necessary, revise these water quality
standards once every three years. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1).
Finally, states are responsible for enforcing water quality
standards in intrastate waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)
(1994).
The PUD Court found that because the CWA exclusively
delegates responsibility for the establishment and mainte-
nance of water quality standards to the states, any interpre-
tation of water quality standards in a NPDES permit was
governed by the same state law that originally gave rise to
the water quality standards. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 713. At
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issue in PUD was the State of Washington's right to condition
their certification of a proposed NPDES permit upon a mini-
mum stream-flow requirement. This minimum stream-flow
requirement was required by Washington so that the affected
stream's designated water quality use would not be impaired.
See id. at 709. The affected stream was designated as a Class
AA water body. See id. at 705. In order to preserve a Class AA
water body's characteristic uses of fish migration, rearing,
and spawning, Washington determined that minimum
stream-flow requirements must be preserved. See id. at 709.
In interpreting whether the minimum stream-flow re-
quirement was in fact necessary to comply with state water
quality standards, the Court looked to not federal law, but
the same state law that originally gave rise to the water qual-
ity standards. See id. at 713-718. Specifically, the Court
turned to Washington's definition of a Class AA water body
and the designated uses Washington attributed to a Class AA
water body. See id. at 714. The Court found that the state's
determination of when a minimum stream-flow requirement
"would be inconsistent with one of the designated uses of
Class AA water" was controlling. See id. Thus, the PUD
Court found that state law, not federal law, governed inter-
pretation of water quality standards in a NPDES permit.
This court should follow the approach established in
PUD and find that state law governs interpretation of when a
discharge violates state water quality standards. The two
cases are very similar. First, both PUD and this case involve
a NPDES permit limitation imposed by the state in order to
ensure that discharges did not violate state water quality
standards. Second, both permit limitations were imposed as a
condition to state certification of a NPDES permit. Third, in
both cases the states had promulgated, and EPA had ap-
proved, the state water quality standards at issue. Thus, this
court must find, pursuant to the holding in PUD, that state
law governs interpretation of when discharges "violate water
quality standards" in XXX's NPDES permit.
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B. This court should reverse the lower court because state
certification of a NPDES permit and the limitations
imposed by state certification are based on state
law, are the exclusive purgative of the state, and
should be governed by state law.
The prohibition in XXX's NPDES permit on discharges
that "violate water quality standards" was included, pursu-
ant to § 401 of the CWA, as a condition of New Union's permit
certification. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). Because the prohibition
was imposed as a certification condition, its interpretation
should be governed by state law. Courts have developed a
rule that any challenge to or review of limitations or condi-
tions imposed by a state's certification must be governed by
state law only and must be challenged in state judicial pro-
ceedings only. See American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d
99, 107-111 (2d Cir. 1997);Ackels v. EPA, 7 F.3d 862, 867 (9th
Cir. 1993); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA,
684 F.2d 1041, 1055-1056 (1st Cir. 1982). This rule should be
extended by analogy to require that when a state certification
condition results in a limitation to a NPDES permit, any reli-
ance in that limitation on water quality standards should be
interpreted in accordance with state, not federal, law.
Under § 401 of the CWA, an applicant for a NPDES per-
mit must seek and be granted certification by the state in
which discharges will occur. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). A state
certifies the NPDES permit when it is satisfied that the per-
mit complies with applicable CWA requirements, state water
quality standards, and any additional state law require-
ments. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d). The state may approve
the NPDES permit as proposed, may deny certification, may
waive its right to certify, or may impose conditions or addi-
tional limitations on certification. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d).
Any conditions or additional limitations imposed by the state
become a part of the NPDES permit when issued by the EPA.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
In Ackels, the Ninth Circuit restated a rule developed by
the courts and the EPA that a challenger's "only recourse is
to challenge the state certification in state judicial proceed-
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ings." Ackels, 7 F.3d at 867. The Ackels court found that, no
matter the merit of the applicant's challenge to certification,
any challenge to or review of limitations or conditions im-
posed by a state's certification must be governed by state law
only and must be challenged in state judicial proceedings
only. See id.
The same result was reached in American Rivers. See
American Rivers, 129 F.3d at 111 (holding that an agency
does not qualify as a state judicial panel qualified to review a
state's certification condition). The American Rivers court
noted that even the EPA operates under a regulation requir-
ing that "[r]eview and appeals of limitations and conditions
attributable to State certification shall be made through the
applicable procedures of the State." Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(e)). An EPA interpretation of the CWA is due consid-
erable deference by the circuit courts. See Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-844.
The rule developed in Ackels and American Rivers, and
adopted by EPA regulation, should be extended to the case at
hand. First, the cases are factually similar. Like the permit
limitations in the Ackels and American Rivers cases, the pro-
hibition against discharges that "violate water quality stan-
dards" in XXX's NPDES permit arose out of a certification
condition imposed by the state. In addition, in all these cases,
the EPA was powerless to do anything but incorporate the
state's certification conditions into the NPDES permit. Thus,
the rule of Ackels and American Rivers provides that, at a
minimum, because state certification of a NPDES permit is
based on state law, any challenge to or review of limitations
or conditions imposed by New Union's certification must be
governed by New Union law only and must be challenged in
New Union judicial proceedings only.
The rationale of the rule in Ackels and American Rivers
lends itself to extension in this case. The rule's rationale is
based on the fact that it is the state or a state agency that
takes action in issuing a certification condition. Because it is
the state or a state agency that takes action, and not the fed-
eral agency issuing a NPDES permit, the action is taken in
accordance with state law. Thus, any challenge to the action
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must be a challenge to state law and a court that sits in re-
view of the challenge must be competent to review state law.
See American Rivers, 129 F.3d at 105-106; Ackels, 7 F.3d at
867. This rationale lends itself to extension in the case at
hand.
Because it is the state of New Union that takes action in
issuing the certification condition, that action is taken in ac-
cordance with state law. In addition, New Union's certifica-
tion condition, in prohibiting discharges that "violate water
quality standards," incorporates water quality standards
which are issued by New Union pursuant state law. Thus, the
certification condition imposed by New Union involves: (1) ac-
tion taken pursuant to state law and (2) applies standards
developed pursuant to state law. Thus, by extending the rule
of Ackels and American Rivers, any interpretation of the cer-
tification condition must be an interpretation of state law and
a court that reviews that condition must use state law to gov-
ern its interpretation of the condition. By so extending the
rule of Ackels and American Rivers, this court should reverse
the district court decision that federal law governs interpre-
tation of the water quality standards referenced in XXX's per-
mit. In place of that decision, this court should find that state
law governs any interpretation of the water quality stan-
dards incorporated into XXX's NPDES permit.
C. This court should reverse the lower court and rule that
state law governs interpretation of New Union's
water quality standards because EPA approval of
the standards does not make the standards
subject to pre-emption or subject to incorporation into
federal law.
Under § 303 of the CWA, states are required to establish
and adopt state water quality standards pursuant to state
law. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A). EPA is then required to
approve the standards if they comport with the requirements
of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(B). States are then re-
quired to review the water quality standards every three
years and make necessary revisions pursuant to state law.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1), (2). This statutory structure estab-
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lishes the clear and manifest purpose of Congress that states
have the primary role in adopting water quality standards
and that states rely on state law to do so. The purpose of Con-
gress is most persuasively evidenced by the language of the
statute. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991);
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542
(1940); Save Our Community v. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1162-
1163 (5th Cir. 1992); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489
(5th Cir. 1977).
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
federal laws that conflict with state laws pre-empt the state
laws. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. However, the Supreme
Court has stated that there is a presumption "against finding
pre-emption of state laws in areas traditionally regulated by
the States... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress." Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495
U.S. 490, 497 (1990) (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp.,
490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)). Areas traditionally regulated by the
states include powers over water exploitation, see Cal. v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 655 (1978), and over regulation
of water quality, see City of Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304,
317 (1981). The Supreme Court's pre-emption test provides
that state laws addressing traditionally regulated areas such
as water quality are pre-empted only if they "actually conflict
with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with
both state and federal law." Cal. v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 506
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 268, 248
(1984)).
Because the use of state law in adopting and interpreting
water quality standards is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress and because the use of state law in interpreting
water quality standards does not conflict with federal law or
make it impossible to comply with federal law, the use of
state law in interpreting water quality standards satisfies the
Supreme Court's test of pre-emption. This court should re-
verse the lower court's holding that water quality standards
are governed by federal law because the lower court based
that holding on the erroneous assertion that federal law has
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pre-empted state law in establishing water quality stan-
dards. See Record 8.
Further, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized
that establishing and revising intrastate water quality stan-
dards remain the exclusive responsibility of the state pursu-
ant to state laws. See Ark. v. Okla., 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
While the Court has held that EPA approval of a state's
water quality standards makes those standards part of the
federal law of water pollution control, see id. at 110, the Court
has limited this holding to the "interstate context," Id. In the
intrastate context, state water quality standards remain the
exclusive purview of the issuing state.
The case at hand involves the intrastate context because,
unlike the situation in Arkansas, the pollutant discharges oc-
curred within the boundaries of New Union and will not af-
fect water quality standards in another state. Thus,
according to Arkansas, in this intrastate context, interpreta-
tion of "water quality standards" as incorporated into XXX's
NPDES permit must be governed by state law. Because the
lower court's order did not correctly apply Arkansas, this
court should reverse and rule that interpretation of water
quality standards referenced in XXX's permit is governed by
state law.
IV. If Federal Law Governs Interpretation of the
Provision in XXX's NPDES Permit that
Prohibits Discharges which "Violate Water
Quality Standards", Then Further
Administrative Action to Either Establish Water
Quality Criteria or Allocate Effluent Waste Load
Is Necessary Before a Citizen's Suit Can Enforce
this Permit Provision.
Under § 505 of the CWA, a citizen action, such as that
brought by FOR, must be brought "against any person . ..
who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or
limitation ... or (B) an order issued.., with respect to such
standard or limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994) (em-
phasis added). Thus, XXX must be violating an effluent stan-
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dard or limitation for FOR's suit validly to lie. Under § 505,
an "effluent standard or limitation" includes "a permit or con-
dition thereof ... which is in effect under this chapter." 33
U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6).
FOR alleges that XXX is in violation of § 505 because
XXX is in violation of an effluent standard or limitation. That
violation, FOR alleges, occurred because XXX's discharge of
selenium violated the prohibition in XXX's NPDES permit
against discharges that "violate water quality standards."
However, water quality standards for the Roaritan consist
only of a designated water quality use and do not include
water quality criterion for selenium. Violation of a designated
use cannot, of itself, constitute violation of an effluent stan-
dard or limitation.
Because XXX cannot violate an effluent standard or limi-
tation by violating a designated use, the lower court's ruling
that FOR's § 505 suit validly lies is incorrect. There are two
reasons why this court should reverse the lower court. First,
under federal law, XXX could not have violated either its
NPDES permit or state water quality standards because the
state standards contain only a designated water quality use
and a designated use is not, in a citizen's suit, independently
enforceable as a water quality standard. Second, even if a
designated use is independently enforceable in a citizen's
suit, before that designated use can be enforced, either New
Union or the EPA must determine how much of a pollutant's
effluent waste load is allocated to various polluters on the
water body.
A. This court should reverse the lower court because,
under federal law, a designated water quality use
without accompanying water quality criterion is
not an independently enforceable water quality
standard in a citizen's suit.
It is very common for a NPDES permit to contain, as did
XXX's permit, prohibitions against violation of water quality
standards. See Bruce Allen Morris, The Oregon Misstep and
The Texas Two Step: Two Recent Appellate Cases Expand
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CWA Citizen Suits, 11 Nat. Resources & Env. 50, 50 (1996).
However, it is not clear whether violations of these prohibi-
tions may be enforced by a citizen suit when water quality
standards consist solely of a designated use. See id. This
court should reverse the lower court's ruling that citizen suits
may be used to enforce these prohibitions because the plain
language of the CWA, the legislative history of the CWA, and
the rulings of the federal courts show that, under federal law,
a designated use is not independently enforceable without ac-
companying water quality criteria that establish specific, nu-
merical effluent limitations.
1. Under the plain meaning of the CWA, an
enforceable water quality standard in a citizen's
suit must include a water quality criterion.
An analysis of whether a designated water quality use is,
in a citizen's suit, independently enforceable as a water qual-
ity standard under the CWA, must begin by turning to the
plain meaning of the statute. See City of Chicago v. Environ-
mental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994). Under § 303
of the CWA, states are required to adopt, and EPA is required
to approve, water quality standards that comply with all
CWA requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A), (B). To
comply with CWA requirements, state adopted water quality
standards are required to consist of two equally important
components: (1) designated water quality uses and (2) water
quality criteria based on those uses. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(1); see also PUD, 511 U.S. at 714. "The text makes it
plain that water quality standards contain [these] two compo-
nents." Id.
However, New Union's water quality standards for the
Roaritan do not contain both of the components required by
the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). The water quality
standards are missing the water quality criterion required by
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). Because the plain language of the
CWA requires that valid water quality standards must con-
tain both a designated water quality use and water quality
criterion, see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1), XXX could not properly
comply with the water quality standards. XXX must know
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what the water quality criterion for selenium are before it
can violate water quality standards by discharging selenium.
Otherwise, the statute would allow numerous "citizen suits to
proceed on the basis of permit violations, where the permittee
complied with end-of-pipe discharge limitations but the water
still wound up being too polluted." Northwest Envtl. Advo-
cates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Kleinfeld, dissenting). Because New Union must adopt water
quality criterion for selenium before XXX can violate water
quality standards, this court should reverse the lower court's
ruling that a designated use is an independently enforceable
water quality standard.
2. According to the legislative history of the CWA,
Congress intended that only an effluent
limitation or a water quality standard that
included a water quality criterion may be
enforced in a citizen's suit.
Congress did not intend that citizen's suits could be
brought to enforce a designated water quality use. See United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 979-
980 (2d Cir. 1984). The Senate Report on the CWA concluded
that enforcement proceedings in a citizen suit were "limited
to effluent standards or limitations established administra-
tively under the Act." S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 80 (1972), re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747. When
contemplating citizen enforcement of the CWA, Congress spe-
cifically intended that citizens would be able to enforce only
the sections of permits that provide "administratively estab-
lished criteria" and would be prohibited from enforcing "tech-
nical evaluations [of] pollutants for which no effluent levels
have been established." Hooker, 749 F.2d at 980 (citing S.
Rep. No. 92-414, at 78-79 (1972)).
In XXX's NPDES permit, prohibitions against the dis-
charge of selenium could come in two forms. First, the permit
could contain EPA established effluent limitations for sele-
nium. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(A) (incorporating effluent
limitations issued by the EPA under 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) into
NPDES permits). Second, the permit could incorporate sele-
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nium discharge levels based on water quality criteria for sele-
nium established under the water quality standards for the
Roaritan. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(1)(B). However, neither of
these forms is included in XXX's permit. The only prohibition
against the selenium discharge is a broad proscription
against discharges that "violate water quality standards."
And those water quality standards contain only a designated
water quality use and lack any water quality criterion. A des-
ignated use is "open-ended" and provides broad goals for
water quality without "specific limitations" for individual pol-
lutants. PUD, 511 U.S. at 716-717. Water quality criteria, on
the other hand, provide "specific numerical limitations" with
established effluent levels upon which a permittee can rely.
Id. at 716.
Because Congress, through its legislative history, in-
tended that only administratively established effluent levels
be enforceable in a § 505 citizen's suit, water quality stan-
dards must contain the specific effluent levels of water qual-
ity criteria before they can be enforced in a § 505 citizen's
suit. In light of the absence of water quality criteria for the
Roaritan and the absence of numerical effluent limitations in
XXX's NPDES permit, this court should reverse the lower
court and dismiss FOR's citizen suit as invalid because it
seeks to enforce broad designated water quality uses that
Congress intended to foreclose from citizen suit enforcement.
3. According to the federal courts, a water quality
standard must be reduced to specific numerical
limitations in the form of either water quality
criteria or effluent limitations before it is
enforceable in a citizen's suit.
The federal courts have held that a water quality stan-
dard must be reduced to a specific numerical limitation in a
NPDES permit before that standard can be enforced in a citi-
zen's suit. Specific numerical limitations can take the form of
either EPA established effluent limitations or discharge
levels based on the water quality criteria component of water
quality standards.
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a. The Supreme Court has opined that the
designated use component of a water quality
standard is not independently enforceable
and, instead, water quality criteria must
be reduced to specific numerical limitations in
a NPDES permit.
In PUD, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a
state's condition that minimum stream flow be maintained
before the state would certify a proposed NPDES permit. See
PUD, 511 U.S. at 703. Under § 401 of the CWA, a state can
condition its certification of a proposed NPDES permit on
compliance with various CWA and state law requirements.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d); PUD, 511 U.S. at 712-713. The
Supreme Court held that it is proper for a state to base its
certification conditions solely on the designated use compo-
nent of water quality standards rather than on water quality
criteria or effluent limitations. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 715.
However, PUD does not stand for either the proposition that
a designated use can be incorporated into a NPDES permit as
an independent permit requirement or the proposition that
violation of a designated water quality use can be indepen-
dently enforced in a citizen's suit.
First, the PUD Court only addressed the narrow ques-
tion of whether the State of Washington could, pursuant to
§ 401 of the CWA, base its certification condition on a desig-
nated water quality use. The Court held that the State of
Washington acted properly in reducing its broadly worded
designated use to a specific numerical minimum stream flow
requirement. See id. at 709. Further, the Supreme Court
noted that "water quality standards are typical in that they
contain several open-ended criteria which, like the use
designation of the river as a fishery, must be translated into
specific limitations for individual projects." Id. at 716 (em-
phasis added). Thus, the PUD Court required that designated
uses must be reduced to numerical limitations before they are
incorporated into a permit. Because the designated use com-
ponent of the water quality standards incorporated into
XXX's permit were not reduced to numerical limitations, this
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court should reverse the lower court and rule that the water
quality standards cannot be enforced by FOR.
Second, the PUD Court only addressed reliance on a des-
ignated use in the narrow context of a state's certification of
proposed NPDES permits. The Court held that, under § 401
of the CWA, a state is authorized to base its numerical certifi-
cation conditions on a designated use. See id. at 714-715.
However, the opinion did not extend that holding so far as to
authorize that a citizen's suit, under § 505, could base an en-
forcement action on a violation of a designated use.
Citizen's suits cannot be used to enforce all CWA viola-
tions. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358-359 (2d Cir. 1994) (citizen suits not per-
mitted to enforce state regulations in a NPDES permit);
Hooker, 749 F.2d at 980-981 (citizen suits not permitted to
enforce emergency powers provision of the CWA). Instead, cit-
izen's suits are limited to enforcement of those violations out-
lined in § 505 of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Save Our
Community, 971 F.2d at 1162. State and federal enforcement,
however, is broad, and encompasses enforcement of all CWA
requirements. See, e.g., Atlantic States, 12 F.3d at 358-359
(only states or EPA may enforce state standards in a NPDES
permit); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d
640 (11th Cir. 1990) (government decides what pollutants are
included in a permit); Hooker, 749 F.2d at 979 (government
enforces emergency powers provision of CWA).
The PUD Court did not extend its holding to citizen's
suits because of this difference in the enforcement responsi-
bilities of citizens, states, and the EPA under the CWA. State
water quality standards are intended to be broad goals to-
ward which enforcement activities of the government can be
aimed. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 992
(Kleinfeld, dissenting). To that end, the Court permitted a
state to base a specific numerical minimum stream flow re-
quirement on a designated use. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 714-
715. However, the Court did not intend that designated uses
could become independently enforceable in a citizen's suit.
The Court instead required that "water quality standards...
must be translated into specific limitations for individual
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projects." Id. at 716. This court should follow the intent of the
PUD Court and rule that FOR, in its citizen suit, cannot en-
force the broad designated water quality uses incorporated
into XXX's permit because those designated uses have not
been translated into specific effluent limitations.
b. A majority of the federal courts have held that
water quality standards must be reduced to
specific numerical limitations before they
can be enforced in a citizen suit.
A majority of the federal courts reviewing the issue have
held that citizens may not sue under § 505 of the CWA to en-
force water quality standards when those standards have not
been reduced to specific, numerical effluent limitations. See
Atlantic States, 12 F.3d at 358-359; Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council v. United States Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842,
850 (9th Cir. 1987); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation
(MESS) v. Weinberger, 707 F.Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Cal.
1989); New York v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 374, 383-384
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). Other courts have implicitly held the same.
See Save Our Community, 971 F.2d at 1162; Hooker, 749 F.2d
at 979 (noting that citizen enforcement "is limited to effluent
standards or limitations established administratively") (quot-
ing S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972)). This court should follow the
trend set by other federal courts and rule that FOR, in a citi-
zen's suit, cannot enforce XXX's permit provision when that
permit has failed to reduce water quality standards to spe-
cific, numerical effluent limitations.
Only the Ninth Circuit and a single district court relying
on that Ninth Circuit opinion have failed to follow the general
trend. The Ninth Circuit instead held that a citizen suit may
be used to enforce permit provisions that prohibit violations
of water quality standards without first reducing those stan-
dards to specific numerical effluent limitations. See North-
west Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 987; Gill v. LDI, No. C97-
461Z, 1998 WL 652529 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 1998) (to be
published in F. Supp.2d). However, in so ruling, the Ninth
Circuit erroneously relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in
PUD. The Ninth Circuit believed PUD stood for the "view
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that Congress intended to confer citizens standing to enforce
water quality standards." Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56
F.3d at 987. However, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
PUD did not involve a citizen suit action. See id. at 988. And
the dissent objected to this interpretation of PUD because
PUD "does not involve a citizen's suit, says nothing about citi-
zen's suits, and implies nothing about citizen's suits." Id. at
990 (Kleinfeld, dissenting). Because the Ninth Circuit errone-
ously interpreted and applied the Supreme Court's PUD
opinion, this court should not follow the Ninth Circuit. In-
stead, this court should reverse the lower court and should
adopt the position of a majority of federal courts that FOR
cannot enforce the water quality standards in XXX's permit
because they have not been reduced to specific, numerical ef-
fluent limitations.
B. This court should reverse the lower court because,
under federal law, an administrative determination
allocating a pollutant's effluent waste load among
various polluters must be made before XXX can
be found in violation of its permit.
Even if the designated water quality use component of a
water quality standard is independently enforceable, federal
law requires additional administrative action before XXX can
be found in violation of its NPDES permit. Federal law re-
quires that either the EPA or New Union, for each discharged
pollutant, administratively allocate, among all dischargers on
a water body, the total effluent waste load that the water
body can handle. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); Arkansas, 503 U.S.
at 108; Atlantic States, 12 F.3d at 358. This equitably allo-
cates the cost of reducing undesirable discharges between ex-
isting sources. See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 108.
New Union and the EPA have failed to allocate the total
effluent waste load for selenium in the Roaritan River. The
record indicates that, in addition to XXX's discharges, at least
one other polluter is discharging selenium into the Roaritan.
See Record 9. Together, the selenium discharged by XXX and
the other polluter lead to selenium levels that exceed the
maximum contaminant level (MCL) for selenium under the
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Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 300f - 300j-25 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996). See Record 9.
While XXX does not concede that the selenium MCL has
any bearing on water quality standards, the EPA and New
Union have still failed to comply with federal law require-
ments that selenium's total effluent waste load be allocated
among all dischargers. Without allocation, neither XXX nor
other selenium dischargers can know if it is their discharges
that cause selenium levels in the Roaritan to exceed the MCL
or if a reduction in their own selenium discharges will have
any effect on selenium levels in the Roaritan. Thus, it is es-
sential that the selenium waste load be allocated before
XXX's selenium discharges are held to violate water quality
standards.
This court should reverse the lower court ruling that
XXX's selenium discharges could be a violation of its NPDES
permit for two reasons. First, because the EPA and New
Union have failed to allocate selenium's total effluent waste
load, enforcement of XXX's selenium discharge as a violation
of water quality standards would be premature. Second, be-
cause the EPA and New Union have failed to allocate sele-
nium's effluent waste load, XXX cannot reasonably know if its
selenium discharges would lead to a violation of water quality
standards for the Roaritan.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, XXX respectfully requests that
this court: (1) reverse the ruling of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union that tributary ground-
water is navigable water under the CWA; (2) affirm the ruling
of the district court that the provision in XXX's permit that
prohibited discharges that "violate water quality standards"
was ripe for review; (3) reverse the ruling of the district court
that interpretation of the provision in XXX's permit is not
governed by state law; and (4) if the interpretation of that
permit provision is instead governed by federal law, reverse
the ruling of the district court that a designated water quality
use can constitute an independent grounds for enforcement of
water quality standards.
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APPENDIX
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994):
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to
be taken from such order, if application is made to it within
ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however,
that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay pro-
ceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994):
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby de-
clared that, consistent with the provisions of this chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an in-
terim goal of water quality which provides for the protec-
tion and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by
July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollu-
tants in toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance
be provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment
works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment
management planning processes be developed and imple-
mented to assure adequate control of sources of pollutants
in each State;
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(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demon-
stration effort be made to develop technology necessary to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable wa-
ters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans; and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and imple-
mented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals
of this chapter to be met through the control of both point
and nonpoint sources of pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994):
(a) Preparation and development
The Administrator shall, after careful investigation, and in
cooperation with other Federal agencies, State water pollu-
tion control agencies, interstate agencies, and the munici-
palities and industries involved, prepare or develop
comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or elimi-
nating the pollution of the navigable waters and ground
waters and improving the sanitary condition of surface and
underground waters. In the development of such compre-
hensive programs due regard shall be given to the improve-
ments which are necessary to conserve such waters for the
protection and propagation of fish and aquatic life and
wildlife, recreational purposes, and the withdrawal of such
waters for public water supply, agricultural, industrial,
and other purposes. For the purpose of this section, the Ad-
ministrator is authorized to make joint investigations with
any such agencies of the condition of any waters in any
State or States, and of the discharges of any sewage, indus-
trial wastes, or substance which may adversely affect such
waters.
33 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994):
(a) Establishment of national programs; cooperation; investi-
gations; water quality surveillance system; reports
The Administrator shall establish national programs for the
prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution and as
part of such programs shall-
(1) in cooperation with other Federal, State, and local
agencies, conduct and promote the coordination and accel-
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eration of, research, investigations, experiments, training,
demonstrations, surveys, and studies relating to the
causes, effects, extent, prevention, reduction, and elimina-
tion of pollution;
(2) encourage, cooperate with, and render technical serv-
ices to pollution control agencies and other appropriate
public or private agencies, institutions, and organizations,
and individuals, including the general public, in the con-
duct of activities referred to in paragraph (1) of this
subsection;
(3) conduct, in cooperation with State water pollution
control agencies and other interested agencies, organiza-
tions and persons, public investigations concerning the pol-
lution of any navigable waters, and report on the results of
such investigations;
(4) establish advisory committees composed of recognized
experts in various aspects of pollution and representatives
of the public to assist in the examination and evaluation of
research progress and proposals and to avoid duplication of
research;
(5) in cooperation with the States, and their political sub-
divisions, and other Federal agencies establish, equip, and
maintain a water quality surveillance system for the pur-
pose of monitoring the quality of the navigable waters and
ground waters and the contiguous zone and the oceans and
the Administrator shall, to the extent practicable, conduct
such surveillance by utilizing the resources of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the United
States Geological Survey, and the Coast Guard, and shall
report on such quality in the report required under subsec-
tion (a) of section 1375 of this title; and
(6) initiate and promote the coordination and accelera-
tion of research designed to develop the most effective prac-
ticable tools and techniques for measuring the social and
economic costs and benefits of activities which are subject
to regulation under this chapter; and shall transmit a re-
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port on the results of such research to the Congress not
later than January 1, 1974.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994):
(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance
with law
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312,
1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge
of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1994):
(b) Timetable for achievement of objectives
In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there shall
be achieved-
(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for
point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works,
(i) which shall require the application of the best practica-
ble control technology currently available as defined by the
Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title, or
(ii) in the case of a discharge into a publicly owned treat-
ment works which meets the requirements of subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph, which shall require
compliance with any applicable pretreatment requirements
and any requirements under section 1317 of this title; and
(B) for publicly owned treatment works in existence on
July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant to section 1283 of this
title prior to June 30, 1974 (for which construction must be
completed within four years of approval), effluent limita-
tions based upon secondary treatment as defined by the
Administrator pursuant to section 1314(d)(1) of this title;
or,
(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limi-
tation, including those necessary to meet water quality
standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compli-
ance, established pursuant to any State law or regulations
(under authority preserved by section 1370 of this title) or
any other Federal law or regulation, or required to imple-
ment any applicable water quality standard established
pursuant to this chapter.
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(2)(A) for pollutants identified in subparagraphs (C), (D),
and (F) of this paragraph, effluent limitations for categories
and classes of point sources, other than publicly owned
treatment works, which (i) shall require application of the
best available technology economically achievable for such
category or class, which will result in reasonable further
progress toward the national goal of eliminating the dis-
charge of all pollutants, as determined in accordance with
regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to sec-
tion 1314(b)(2) of this title, which such effluent limitations
shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants
if the Administrator finds, on the basis of information
available to him (including information developed pursu-
ant to section 1325 of this title), that such elimination is
technologically and economically achievable for a category
or class of point sources as determined in accordance with
regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to sec-
tion 1314(b)(2) of this title, or (ii) in the case of the intro-
duction of a pollutant into a publicly owned treatment
works which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B)
of this paragraph, shall require compliance with any appli-
cable pretreatment requirements and any other require-
ment under section 1317 of this title;
(B) Repealed. Pub.L. 97-117, S 21(b), Dec. 29, 1981, 95
Stat. 1632.
(C) with respect to all toxic pollutants referred to in table
1 of Committee Print Numbered 95-30 of the Committee on
Public Works and Transportation of the House of Repre-
sentatives compliance with effluent limitations in accord-
ance with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph as
expeditiously as practicable but in no case later than three
years after the date such limitations are promulgated
under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no case later than
March 31, 1989;
(D) for all toxic pollutants listed under paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) of section 1317 of this title which are not re-
ferred to in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph compliance
with effluent limitations in accordance with subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph as expeditiously. as practicable, but in
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no case later than three years after the date such limita-
tions are promulgated under section 1314(b) of this title,
and in no case later than March 31, 1989;
(E) as expeditiously as practicable but in no case later
than three years after the date such limitations are
promulgated under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no
case later than March 31, 1989, compliance with effluent
limitations for categories and classes of point sources, other
than publicly owned treatment works, which in the case of
pollutants identified pursuant to section 1314(a)(4) of this
title shall require application of the best conventional pol-
lutant control technology as determined in accordance with
regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to sec-
tion 1314(b)(4) of this title; and
(F) for all pollutants (other than those subject to subpar-
agraphs (C), (D), or (E) of this paragraph) compliance with
effluent limitations in accordance with subparagraph (A) of
this paragraph as expeditiously as practicable but in no
case later than 3 years after the date such limitations are
established, and in no case later than March 31, 1989.
(3)(A) for effluent limitations under paragraph (1)(A)(i) of
this subsection promulgated after January 1, 1982, and re-
quiring a level of control substantially greater or based on
fundamentally different control technology than under per-
mits for an industrial category issued before such date,
compliance as expeditiously as practicable but in no case
later than three years after the date such limitations are
promulgated under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no
case later than March 31, 1989; and
(B) for any effluent limitation in accordance with para-
graph (1)(A)(i), (2)(A)(i), or (2)(E) of this subsection estab-
lished only on the basis of section 1342(a)(1) of this title in
a permit issued after February 4, 1987, compliance as expe-
ditiously as practicable but in no case later than three
years after the date such limitations are established, and in
no case later than March 31, 1989.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(a), (c) (1994):
(a) Existing water quality standards
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(1) In order to carry out the purpose of this chapter, any
water quality standard applicable to interstate waters
which was adopted by any State and submitted to, and ap-
proved by, or is awaiting approval by, the Administrator
pursuant to this Act as in effect immediately prior to Octo-
ber 18, 1972, shall remain in effect unless the Administra-
tor determined that such standard is not consistent with
the applicable requirements of this Act as in effect immedi-
ately prior to October 18, 1972. If the Administrator makes
such a determination he shall, within three months after
October 18, 1972, notify the State and specify the changes
needed to meet such requirements. If such changes are not
adopted by the State within ninety days after the date of
such notification, the Administrator shall promulgate such
changes in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Any State which, before October 18, 1972, has
adopted, pursuant to its own law, water quality standards
applicable to intrastate waters shall submit such standards
to the Administrator within thirty days after October 18,
1972. Each such standard shall remain in effect, in the
same manner and to the same extent as any other water
quality standard established under this chapter unless the
Administrator determines that such standard is inconsis-
tent with the applicable requirements of this Act as in ef-
fect immediately prior to October 18, 1972. If the
Administrator makes such a determination he shall not
later than the one hundred and twentieth day after the
date of submission of such standards, notify the State and
specify the changes needed to meet such requirements. If
such changes are not adopted by the State within ninety
days after such notification, the Administrator shall pro-
mulgate such changes in accordance with subsection (b) of
this section.
(3)(A) Any State which prior to October 18, 1972, has not
adopted pursuant to its own laws water quality standards
applicable to intrastate waters shall, not later than one
hundred and eighty days after October 18, 1972, adopt and
submit such standards to the Administrator.
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(B) If the Administrator determines that any such stan-
dards are consistent with the applicable requirements of
this Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18, 1972,
he shall approve such standards.
(C) If the Administrator determines that any such stan-
dards are not consistent with the applicable requirements
of this Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18,
1972, he shall, not later than the ninetieth day after the
date of submission of such standards, notify the State and
specify the changes to meet such requirements. If such
changes are not adopted by the State within ninety days
after the date of notification, the Administrator shall pro-
mulgate such standards pursuant to subsection (b) of this
section.
(c) Review; revised standard; publication
(1) The Governor of a State or the State water pollution
control agency of such State shall from time to time (but at
least once each three year period beginning with October
18, 1972) hold public hearings for the purpose of reviewing
applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate,
modifying and adopting standards. Results of such review
shall be made available to the Administrator.
(2)(A) Whenever the State revises or adopts a new stan-
dard, such revised or new standard shall be submitted to
the Administrator. Such revised or new water quality
standard shall consist of the designated uses of the naviga-
ble waters involved and the water quality criteria for such
waters based upon such uses. Such standards shall be
such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the
quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter.
Such standards shall be established taking into considera-
tion their use and value for public water supplies, propaga-
tion of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and
agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also tak-
ing into consideration their use and value for navigation.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994):
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(d) Identification of areas with insufficient controls; maxi-
mum daily load; certain effluent limitations revision
(1)(A) Each State shall identify those waters within its
boundaries for which the effluent limitations required by
section 1311(b)(1)(A) and section 1311(b)(1)(B) of this title
are not stringent enough to implement any water quality
standard applicable to such waters. The State shall estab-
lish a priority ranking for such waters, taking into account
the severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of such
waters.
(B) Each State shall identify those waters or parts
thereof within its boundaries for which controls on thermal
discharges under section 1311 of this title are not stringent
enough to assure protection and propagation of a balanced
indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife.
(C) Each State shall establish for the waters identified in
paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, and in accordance with
the priority ranking, the total maximum daily load, for
those pollutants which the Administrator identifies under
section 1314(a)(2) of this title as suitable for such calcula-
tion. Such load shall be established at a level necessary to
implement the applicable water quality standards with
seasonal variations and a margin of safety which takes into
account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality.
(D) Each State shall estimate for the waters identified in
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection the total maximum
daily thermal load required to assure protection and propa-
gation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish
and wildlife. Such estimates shall take into account the
normal water temperatures, flow rates, seasonal varia-
tions, existing sources of heat input, and the dissipative ca-
pacity of the identified waters or parts thereof. Such
estimates shall include a calculation of the maximum heat
input that can be made into each such part and shall in-
clude a margin of safety which takes into account any lack
of knowledge concerning the development of thermal water
quality criteria for such protection and propagation in the
identified waters or parts thereof.
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(2) Each State shall submit to the Administrator from
time to time, with the first such submission not later than
one hundred and eighty days after the date of publication
of the first identification of pollutants under section
1314(a)(2)(D) of this title, for his approval the waters iden-
tified and the loads established under paragraphs (1)(A),
(1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D) of this subsection. The Adminis-
trator shall either approve or disapprove such identifica-
tion and load not later than thirty days after the date of
submission. If the Administrator approves such identifica-
tion and load, such State shall incorporate them into its
current plan under subsection (e) of this section. If the Ad-
ministrator disapproves such identification and load, he
shall not later than thirty days after the date of such disap-
proval identify such waters in such State and establish
such loads for such waters as he determines necessary to
implement the water quality standards applicable to such
waters and upon such identification and establishment the
State shall incorporate them into its current plan under
subsection (e) of this section.
(3) For the specific purpose of developing information,
each State shall identify all waters within its boundaries
which it has not identified under paragraph (1)(A) and
(1)(B) of this subsection and estimate for such waters the
total maximum daily load with seasonal variations and
margins of safety, for those pollutants which the Adminis-
trator identifies under section 1314(a)(2) of this title as
suitable for such calculation and for thermal discharges, at
a level that would assure protection and propagation of a
balanced indigenous population of fish, shellfish and
wildlife.
(4) Limitations on revision of certain effluent limitations
(A) Standard not attained
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the
applicable water quality standard has not yet been at-
tained, any effluent limitation based on a total maximum
daily load or other waste load allocation established under
this section may be revised only if (i) the cumulative effect
of all such revised effluent limitations based on such total
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maximum daily load or waste load allocation will assure
the attainment of such water quality standard, or (ii) the
designated use which is not being attained is removed in
accordance with regulations established under this section.
(B) Standard attained
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the
quality of such waters equals or exceeds levels necessary to
protect the designated use for such waters or otherwise re-
quired by applicable water quality standards, any effluent
limitation based on a total maximum daily load or other
waste load allocation established under this section, or any
water quality standard established under this section, or
any other permitting standard may be revised only if such
revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegrada-
tion policy established under this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1994):
(a) State enforcement; compliance orders
(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available
to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in viola-
tion of any condition or limitation which implements sec-
tion 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title
in a permit issued by a State under an approved permit
program under section 1342 or 1344 of this title, he shall
proceed under his authority in paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion or he shall notify the person in alleged violation and
such State of such finding. If beyond the thirtieth day after
the Administrator's notification the State has not com-
menced appropriate enforcement action, the Administrator
shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with
such condition or limitation or shall bring a civil action in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to
him, the Administrator finds that violations of permit con-
ditions or limitations as set forth in paragraph (1) of this
subsection are so widespread that such violations appear to
result from a failure of the State to enforce such permit
conditions or limitations effectively, he shall so notify the
State. If the Administrator finds such failure extends be-
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yond the thirtieth day after such notice, he shall give public
notice of such finding. During the period beginning with
such public notice and ending when such State satisfies the
Administrator that it will enforce such conditions and limi-
tations (hereafter referred to in this section as the period of
"federally assumed enforcement"), except where an exten-
sion has been granted under paragraph (5)(B) of this sub-
section, the Administrator shall enforce any permit
condition or limitation with respect to any person-
(A) by issuing an order to comply with such condition or
limitation, or
(B) by bringing a civil action under subsection (b) of this
section.
(3) Whenever on the basis of any information available to
him the Administrator finds that any person is in violation
of section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of
this title, or is in violation of any permit condition or limita-
tion implementing any of such sections in a permit issued
under section 1342 of this title by him or by a State or in a
permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, he
shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with
such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action
in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(4) A copy of any order issued under this subsection shall
be sent immediately by the Administrator to the State in
which the violation occurs and other affected States. In
any case in which an order under this subsection (or notice
to a violator under paragraph (1) of this subsection) is is-
sued to a corporation, a copy of such order (or notice) shall
be served on any appropriate corporate officers. An order
issued under this subsection relating to a violation of sec-
tion 1318 of this title shall not take effect until the person
to whom it is issued has had an opportunity to confer with
the Administrator concerning the alleged violation.
(5)(A) Any order issued under this subsection shall be by
personal service, shall state with reasonable specificity the
nature of the violation, and shall specify a time for compli-
ance not to exceed thirty days in the case of a violation of
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an interim compliance schedule or operation and mainte-
nance requirement and not to exceed a time the Adminis-
trator determines to be reasonable in the case of a violation
of a final deadline, taking into account the seriousness of
the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with ap-
plicable requirements.
(B) The Administrator may, if he determines (i) that any
person who is a violator of, or any person who is otherwise
not in compliance with, the time requirements under this
chapter or in any permit issued under this chapter, has ac-
ted in good faith, and has made a commitment (in the form
of contracts or other securities) of necessary resources to
achieve compliance by the earliest possible date after July
1, 1977, but not later than April 1, 1979; (ii) that any ex-
tension under this provision will not result in the imposi-
tion of any additional controls on any other point or
nonpoint source; (iii) that an application for a permit
under section 1342 of this title was filed for such person
prior to December 31, 1974; and (iv) that the facilities nec-
essary for compliance with such requirements are under
construction, grant an extension of the date referred to in
section 1311(b)(1)(A) of this title to a date which will
achieve compliance at the earliest time possible but not
later than April 1, 1979.
(6) Whenever, on the basis of information available to
him, the Administrator finds (A) that any person is in viola-
tion of section 1311(b)(1)(A) or (C) of this title, (B) that such
person cannot meet the requirements for a time extension
under section 1311(i)(2) of this title, and (C) that the most
expeditious and appropriate means of compliance with this
chapter by such person is to discharge into a publicly
owned treatment works, then, upon request of such person,
the Administrator may issue an order requiring such per-
son to comply with this chapter at the earliest date practi-
cable, but not later than July 1, 1983, by discharging into a
publicly owned treatment works if such works concur with
such order. Such order shall include a schedule of
compliance.
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33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d) (1994):
(a) Compliance with applicable requirements; applica-
tion; procedures; license suspension
(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to con-
duct any activity including, but not limited to, the construc-
tion or operation of facilities, which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the li-
censing or permitting agency a certification from the State
in which the discharge originates or will originate, or, if ap-
propriate, from the interstate water pollution control
agency having jurisdiction over the navigable waters at the
point where the discharge originates or will originate, that
any such discharge will comply with the applicable provi-
sions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this
title. In the case of any such activity for which there is not
an applicable effluent limitation or other limitation under
sections 1311(b) and 1312 of this title, and there is not an
applicable standard under sections 1316 and 1317 of this
title, the State shall so certify, except that any such certifi-
cation shall not be deemed to satisfy section 1371(c) of this
title. Such State or interstate agency shall establish proce-
dures for public notice in the case of all applications for cer-
tification by it and, to the extent it deems appropriate,
procedures for public hearings in connection with specific
applications. In any case where a State or interstate
agency has no authority to give such a certification, such
certification shall be from the Administrator. If the State,
interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case may be,
fails or refuses to act on a request for certification, within a
reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year)
after receipt of such request, the certification requirements
of this subsection shall be waived with respect to such Fed-
eral application. No license or permit shall be granted until
the certification required by this section has been obtained
or has been waived as provided in the preceding sentence.
No license or permit shall be granted if certification has
been denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Admin-
istrator, as the case may be.
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(2) Upon receipt of such application and certification the
licensing or permitting agency shall immediately notify the
Administrator of such application and certification. When-
ever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the Ad-
ministrator, the quality of the waters of any other State,
the Administrator within thirty days of the date of notice of
application for such Federal license or permit shall so no-
tify such other State, the licensing or permitting agency,
and the applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of such
notification, such other State determines that such dis-
charge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate
any water quality requirement in such State, and within
such sixty-day period notifies the Administrator and the li-
censing or permitting agency in writing of its objection to
the issuance of such license or permit and requests a public
hearing on such objection, the licensing or permitting
agency shall hold such a hearing. The Administrator shall
at such hearing submit his evaluation and recommenda-
tions with respect to any such objection to the licensing or
permitting agency. Such agency, based upon the recom-
mendations of such State, the Administrator, and upon any
additional evidence, if any, presented to the agency at the
hearing, shall condition such license or permit in such
manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with ap-
plicable water quality requirements. If the imposition of
conditions cannot insure such compliance such agency
shall not issue such license or permit.
(3) The certification obtained pursuant to paragraph (1)
of this subsection with respect to the construction of any
facility shall fulfill the requirements of this subsection with
respect to certification in connection with any other Fed-
eral license or permit required for the operation of such fa-
cility unless, after notice to the certifying State, agency, or
Administrator, as the case may be, which shall be given by
the Federal agency to whom application is made for such
operating license or permit, the State, or if appropriate, the
interstate agency or the Administrator, notifies such
agency within sixty days after receipt of such notice that
there is no longer reasonable assurance that there will be
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compliance with the applicable provisions of sections 1311,
1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title because of changes
since the construction license or permit certification was is-
sued in (A) the construction or operation of the facility, (B)
the characteristics of the waters into which such discharge
is made, (C) the water quality criteria applicable to such
waters or (D) applicable effluent limitations or other re-
quirements. This paragraph shall be inapplicable in any
case where the applicant for such Operating license or per-
mit has failed to provide the certifying State, or, if appro-
priate, the interstate agency or the Administrator, with
notice of any proposed changes in the construction or oper-
ation of the facility with respect to which a construction li-
cense or permit has been granted, which changes may
result in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or
1317 of this title.
(4) Prior to the initial operation of any federally licensed
or permitted facility or activity which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters and with respect to
which a certification has been obtained pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, which facility or activity is not
subject to a Federal operating license or permit, the licen-
see or permittee shall provide an opportunity for such certi-
fying State, or, if appropriate, the interstate agency or the
Administrator to review the manner in which the facility or
activity shall be operated or conducted for the purposes of
assuring that applicable effluent limitations or other limi-
tations or other applicable water quality requirements will
not be violated. Upon notification by the certifying State,
or if appropriate, the interstate agency or the Administra-
tor that the operation of any such federally licensed or per-
mitted facility or activity will violate applicable effluent
limitations or other limitations or other water quality re-
quirements such Federal agency may, after public hearing,
suspend such license or permit. If such license or permit is
suspended, it shall remain suspended until notification is
received from the certifying State, agency, or Administra-
tor, as the case may be, that there is reasonable assurance
that such facility or activity will not violate the applicable
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provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317 of this
title.
(5) Any Federal license or permit with respect to which a
certification has been obtained under paragraph (1) of this
subsection may be suspended or revoked by the Federal
agency issuing such license or permit upon the entering of
a judgment under this chapter that such facility or activity
has been operated in violation of the applicable provisions
of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317 of this title.
(6) Except with respect to a permit issued under section
1342 of this title, in any case where actual construction of a
facility has been lawfully commenced prior to April 3, 1970,
no certification shall be required under this subsection for a
license or permit issued after April 3, 1970, to operate such
facility, except that any such license or permit issued with-
out certification shall terminate April 3, 1973, unless prior
to such termination date the person having such license or
permit submits to the Federal agency which issued such li-
cense or permit a certification and otherwise meets the re-
quirements of this section.
(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of
certification
Any certification provided under this section shall set
forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and
monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any ap-
plicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any
applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under
section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance
under section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent
standard, or pretreatment standard under section 1317 of
this title, and with any other appropriate requirement of
State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a
condition on any Federal license or permit subject to the
provisions of this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994):
(a) Permits for discharge of pollutants
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(1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this
title, the Administrator may, after opportunity for public
hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant,
or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section
1311(a) of this title, upon condition that such discharge will
meet either (A) all applicable requirements under sections
1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or (B)
prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relat-
ing to all such requirements, such conditions as the Admin-
istrator determines are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such
permits to assure compliance with the requirements of par-
agraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions on data
and information collection, reporting, and such other re-
quirements as he deems appropriate.
(3) The permit program of the Administrator under para-
graph (1) of this subsection, and permits issued thereun-
der, shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and
requirements as apply to a State permit program and per-
mits issued thereunder under subsection (b) of this section.
(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable waters
issued pursuant to section 407 of this title, shall be deemed
to be permits issued under this subchapter, and permits is-
sued under this subchapter shall be deemed to be permits
issued under section 407 of this title, and shall continue in
force and effect for their term unless revoked, modified, or
suspended in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.
(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable waters
shall be issued under section 407 of this title after October
18, 1972. Each application for a permit under section 407
of this title, pending on October 18, 1972, shall be deemed
to be an application for a permit under this section. The
Administrator shall authorize a State, which he deter-
mines has the capability of administering a permit pro-
gram which will carry out the objective of this chapter, to
issue permits for discharges into the navigable waters
within the jurisdiction of such State. The Administrator
1999] BRIEF 527
63
528 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
may exercise the authority granted him by the preceding
sentence only during the period which begins on October
18, 1972, and ends either on the ninetieth day after the
date of the first promulgation of guidelines required by sec-
tion 1314(i)(2) of this title, or the date of approval by the
Administrator of a permit program for such State under
subsection (b) of this section, whichever date first occurs,
and no such authorization to a State shall extend beyond
the last day of such period. Each such permit shall be sub-
ject to such conditions as the Administrator determines are
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. No
such permit shall issue if the Administrator objects to such
issuance.
33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7), (12) (1994):
Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used in
this chapter:
(7) The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.
(12) The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term
"discharge of pollutants" each means (A) any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,
(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the con-
tiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than
a vessel or other floating craft.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994):
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and
section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency
to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an ef-
fluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
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under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without re-
gard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation,
or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any ap-
propriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (1994):
() Effluent standard or limitation
For purposes of this section, the term "effluent standard
or limitation under this chapter" means (1) effective July 1,
1973, an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section 1311
of this title; (2) an effluent limitation or other limitation
under section 1311 or 1312 of this title; (3) standard of per-
formance under section 1316 of this title; (4) prohibition,
effluent standard or pretreatment standards under section
1317 of this title; (5) certification under section 1341 of this
title; (6) a permit or condition thereof issued under section
1342 of this title, which is in effect under this chapter (in-
cluding a requirement applicable by reason of section 1323
of this title); or (7) a regulation under section 1345(d) of
this title.
33 U.S.C. 1369 (b)(1),(2) (1994)
(b) Review of Administrator's action; selection of court;
fees
(1) Review of the Administrator's action (A) in promul-
gating any standard of performance under section 1316 of
this title, (B) in making any determination pursuant to sec-
tion 1316(b)(1)(C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any ef-
fluent standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard
under section 1317 of this title, (D) in making any determi-
nation as to a State permit program submitted under sec-
tion 1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating
any effluent limitation or other limitation under section
1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title, (F) in issuing or de-
nying any permit under section 1342 of this title, and (G) in
promulgating any individual control strategy under section
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1314(1) of this title, may be had by any interested person in
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the
Federal judicial district in which such person resides or
transacts business which is directly affected by such action
upon application by such person. Any such application
shall be made within 120 days from the date of such deter-
mination, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or af-
ter such date only if such application is based solely on
grounds which arose after such 120th day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which re-
view could have been obtained under paragraph (1) of this
subsection shall not be subject to judicial review in any
civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.
40 C.F.R. 2 30.3(s)(3) (1994):
For purposes of this Part, the following terms shall have
the meanings indicated:
(s) The term "waters of the United States" means:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in
the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or for-
eign commerce, including all waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand-
flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or de-
struction of which could affect interstate or foreign com-
merce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial pur-
poses by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as wa-
ters of the United States under this definition.
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of this section;
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(6) The territorial sea;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that
are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (s)(1)-(6)
of this section; waste treatment systems, including treat-
ment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements
of CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR
423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this definition)
are not waters of the United States.
Waters of the United States do not include prior con-
verted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an
area's status as prior converted cropland by any other fed-
eral agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the
final authority regarding Clean Water Act jurisdiction re-
mains with EPA.
40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (1994):
(e) Review and appeals of limitations and conditions at-
tributable to State certification shall be made through the
applicable procedures of the State and may not be made
through the procedures in this part.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1994):
For the purpose of this regulation these terms are de-
fined as follows:
(a) The term "waters of the United States" means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in
the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or for-
eign commerce, including all waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand-
flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or de-
struction of which could affect interstate or foreign com-
merce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
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(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial pur-
pose by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as wa-
ters of the United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-
(4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that
are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(6)
of this section.
(8) Waters of the United States do not include prior con-
verted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an
area's status as prior converted cropland by any other fed-
eral agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the
final authority regarding Clean Water Act jurisdiction re-
mains with EPA.
Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or
lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other
than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 123.11(m) which
also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of
the United States.
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